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Abstract 
Much of the debate on industrialization and displacement has, so far, 
focused on the optimum compensation for affected households. Our 
recently concluded study, comprising of a sample of 1017 households 
including 630 affected (displaced and land acquired) and 387 unaffected 
households, looks at the long-term livelihood effects of the Falta Special 
Economic Zone in West Bengal, India. The main findings indicate a 
lower labour market participation rate among affected household 
members. However, members of displaced households show the highest 
work participation rate in the industrial zone but with a lower return to 
education than others. Women earn about 17 percentage points less 
compared to men after controlling for education and experience and this 
gap is 5 to 10 percentage points higher for FSEZ employees; but this gap 
is narrowing over time likewise the gender education gap.  
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I. Introduction 
Recent Industrialization efforts in India, particularly in West Bengal, have created 
widespread social and political tensions. Most of this is attributed to land-grab incidents for 
building industrial parks (Sarkar, 2007), which have been marred with resistance often 
transgressing into violent riots with casualties. This stirred policy debates that revolve around 
the trade-off between industrialization and mass welfare, and towards finding an alternative 
industrial-development policy. Concerns that received much attention are (a) optimum 
compensation for affected people and (b) livelihood benefits of industrial zones.   
A growing number of studies have focussed on the welfare effect of optimum compensation 
in the context of industrialization-led displacement. In a recent study, Ghatak and 
Mookherjee (2011) find that the reservation prices of most land owners are higher than the 
market price of land. As a result, they recommend that the compensation should be higher 
than the market value. Going one step further, Ghatak and Ghosh (2011) suggest a revision of 
the Land Acquisition bill enacted in 1894, which binds compensation based on the market 
value of land at the time of acquisition. The authors suggest an auctioning of land for 
households willing to give up land and consequently, an extended to a multi-stage auction for 
the choice of location of a factory. In a related vein, a recent study by Ghatak et al. (2013) 
finds that under-compensation relative to market value significantly raised the likelihood of 
rejecting the compensation offer. They also find that forced acquisition of land resulted in 
reduction in income growth.  
However, little is known about the livelihood consequences of the establishment of an 
industrial area, especially on affected households. The specific concerns, such as whether the 
promised jobs by the state authority be available to the semi-literate rural households with 
very little skill formation or would the effects of industrialization trickle down to livelihoods 
of affected households, have been raised by activists and economists alike (Banerjee et al, 
2012). This paper bridges this knowledge gap by addressing the long-term effects of setting 
up of a special economic zone (SEZ). We focus on assessing the livelihood effects of the 
Falta Special Economic Zone (FSEZ, hereon), which was established in West Bengal, India 
in 1984. We chose FSEZ as the subject of our study for several reasons. First, FSEZ is 
located in West Bengal and the first of its kind. Given the recent incidents of SEZ-led 
displacement followed by a socio-political upheaval, we like to focus on West Bengal. 
Second, the FSEZ has been a relatively successful SEZ in West Bengal (Shalti Research 
Group, 2008) and third, being established in 1984, FSEZ allows a sufficiently long period to 
assess its livelihood effects.   
FSEZ was the first EZ in the state of West Bengal India, and to date, one of the more 
successful such industrial parks in the country. The zone currently houses 72 companies 
registered as being operational, however of them, only 52 companies are reported to be fully 
functioning
1
. The setup of FSEZ was conducted through acquisition of land from two major 
parties: the Calcutta Port Trust – a state enterprise (contributes to more than 60% of FSEZ 
land), the villages of Akalmegh and Uttar Simulbera (contributes to about a third of FSEZ 
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land). 80 acres of land was also acquired from a third village – „Gopalpur‟, to resettle affected 
villagers from the aforementioned two villages of Akalmegh and Uttar Simulberia. While 
most villagers from Akalmegh and Uttar Simulberia (hereon referred to as displaced 
households) had to give up their residence and residential land, most villagers from Gopalpur 
(hereon referred to as land acquired households) had to give up their agricultural land for the 
settling of those displaced villagers. We used this FSEZ land acquisition policies as a source 
of exogenous variation in the livelihood outcomes of different household categories. We 
conducted a survey in the study area administratively divided into 13 villages under the 
Kalatalahat Panchayat, within the Diamond Harbour sub division of the Diamond Harbour II 
block, West Bengal. We surveyed all the directly affected households (630 in total, including 
displaced households and land acquired households
2
) and a sample of 387 households who 
are indirectly affected by FSEZ.  
 
We are primarily interested in examining whether the livelihood outcomes of displaced 
households are comparable to that of other households, directly or indirectly affected by 
setting up of FSEZ, after a period of almost 30 years since the FSEZ was set up. The specific 
questions that interest us are:  
(a) What is the likelihood of a displaced household member (i) being employed? and (ii) 
being employed at the FSEZ?  
(b) Do members of displaced households enjoy similar returns to education and 
experience compared to other affected households? Does this result hold for those 
working at FSEZ? 
(c) Does the FSEZ generate employment for women?  
(d) Does FSEZ prevent/reduce gender wage discrimination?  
 
A designated industrial area (primarily as export promoting zone) to facilitate trade and 
investment was first introduced in Spain in 1929. China established its first EPZ in 1979, 
almost half a century later. However, from 1986 to 2003, the number of such zones increased 
from 176 across 47 countries to beyond 3000 across 116 countries (ILO, 2003). The success 
of the Chinese industrialization model motivated other developing to adopt similar growth 
initiatives contributing to the significant growth of designated industrial areas, globally. In 
India, the first SEZ (then known as Export Processing Zone), was setup in 1965 in Kandla. 
While a few decades since then witnessed a modest growth of SEZs, the 2000 SEZ policy 
announced by the central government has accelerated the growth of SEZs totalling to 143 and 
an additional 634 proposed SEZ in the pipeline as of  2012 (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, India).
3
 
 
Despite its growing policy relevance especially for the developing world, the research on the 
potential effect of industrialization on livelihoods of affected persons is relatively scant. Kim 
(2013) shows that the Chinese led SEZs in Africa, have proved to be unpopular amongst the 
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 These households‟ lands were taken to accommodate the displaced households in a model village called 
“Highland”  
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locals due to (a) lack of respect for basic workers‟ rights (b) alleged violation of minimum 
wage legislation and (c) complaints about poor working conditions. The study that is closest 
to ours in spirit is by Tejani (2011). This study finds that export liberalisation and the setup of 
special economic zones are positively correlated with the feminsation of the workforce. 
Historically, women were paid no more than 60% of the wages enjoyed by men in Asian 
SEZs (with the exception of Myanmar and Sri Lanka) until the 90s. Even to date, in most 
SEZ around the world women are paid less than their male counterparts for the same work, 
Myanmar being an exception (Tejani, 2011). In India, SEZ have received wide spread 
attention for the broad societal hardships they bestow upon rural and indigenous communities 
(Sarma, 2007). As Sarma (2007) further points out, while SEZ bring in economic benefits to 
the wider nation and its populous, this is sometimes at the expense of victimizing local 
communities via adverse measures such as land grabs, loss of land, loss of agriculture and 
displacements. 
The empirical findings from this study indicate a lower labour market participation rate 
among affected household members, however gender gap in labour market activities persist 
across all households. We find that members from displaced households are 8 per cent more 
likely to be employed in FSEZ compared to unaffected households whereas members of land 
acquired households were about 5 per cent less likely to be employed within FSEZ. We find 
strong positive returns to education among all three categories of households. Completion of 
secondary and higher education is associated with an increase in wages within the range of 12 
to 50 percentage points. However, returns to education are significantly lower for displaced 
households working within FSEZ, and this outcome is predominantly driven by female 
employees. Among female employees within FSEZ, members of displaced households earn 
less consistently across each schooling year. Among the active labour market participants, 
more than 50 per cent of female employees from displaced and unaffected household groups 
work in FSEZ. Gender wage gap persist, our estimates show that women earn about 17 
percentage points less compared to men after controlling for education and experience. 
Overall, there is evidence of the narrowing gender education gap over time, likewise a 
narrowing gender wage gap.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section II describes the survey design and provides 
some descriptive evidence. We discuss the empirical models and empirical findings in section 
III, which is followed by discussion and implications of the findings in section IV. We 
forward concluding remarks in section V.  
 
II. Sampling methodology, data and descriptive evidence 
 
II-A. Objectives and criteria for sampling frames for villages  
The research area is administratively divided into 13 villages under the Kalatalahat 
Panchayat, within the Diamond Harbour sub division of the Diamond Harbour II block. Our 
objective was to have households in all the 3 categories: (A) Displaced Households, (B) Land 
Acquired Households and (C) Unaffected Households. In Figure 2.1, displaced households 
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(category A) are now resettled in the area identified as „2‟ and land acquired households 
(category B) are resident in the area identified as „3‟.We conducted a complete census of 
these two villages – Highland and Gopalpur, respectively.   
 
[Figure 2.1 is about here] 
 
There are a number of villages within a 5km radius of FSEZ that fit the criterion of Category 
„C‟. However, given that our research objective is to assess the effect of displacement on 
livelihood impacts, proximity to FSEZ was vital. This is because; distance to FSEZ could be 
a factor that affects employment prospects and the severity of affects by the setup of FSEZ. 
As such, we also avoid taking an entire village, because for example, households on either 
side of FSEZ may be more similarly affected by FSEZ rather than households in an adjacent 
village but at a greater distance from FSEZ. Therefore, we restricted our sample to 
households that were within a 500m radius of FSEZ. This effectively narrowed down to 
about the northern half of „Nainan‟ village (identified as „1‟ in Figure 2.1). By measuring a 
500m radius cut-off point; we drew an imaginary border through the village of „Nainan‟ for 
our sampling purpose (refer Figure 2.2). And similarly, the proximity of Nainan to Gopalpur 
and Highland, also means that Nainan shares similar characteristics to the affected villages in 
terms of infrastructure and access to facilities such as schools, health clinics, banks, and local 
administrative offices. 
 
[Figure 2.2 about here] 
 
II-B. Data 
Our questionnaire was administered at the household level, but also contains information at 
the individual level in additional to the household level data. The head/spouse of the head of 
the household or a „knowledgeable‟ member of the family was asked to be the respondent for 
each administered questionnaire. In addition, we also record whether individuals recorded as 
part of the survey were at the time of the interview, present, and seen. Our data comprises of 
1017 households. This includes 462 households from the first category (those who were 
physically displaced), 168 from the second category (those whose land was acquired to settle 
those in the first group), and 387 households who were not affected (our control group). At 
the individual level we have 4,780 observations, a breakdown of this by village and category 
is summarised in panel B, Table 2.1. The questionnaire entails questions on 7 broad 
categories: (1) Household composition, (2) Household expenditure, (3) Household assets, (4) 
Livelihood activities, (5) Migration and remittances, (6) Impact of FSEZ and (7) Attitudes 
and value system.  
 
[Table 2.1 about here] 
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Our summary statistics show that individual and household characteristics to a large extent 
balanced across the three villages, at most within a 10 per cent deviation from the total 
population mean for each variable (with the exception of education attainment). Members 
from Gopalpur were older and tended to be on the extreme ends of the education attainment 
spectrum compared to those from Highland and Nainan. Households in Gopalpur tended to 
have the highest per capita adult expenditure, followed by Highland and closely trailed by 
Nainan. On average, households had about 5 members, with one of them being a child under 
the age of 13. Other descriptive statistics relevant to our question of interest are discussed in 
more detail in the following sections. 
 
II-C. Livelihood Effects 
One of the long term impacts of forced displacement is the loss of livelihoods (Lam and Paul, 
2013). This is even more so the case, when loss of livelihoods is not compensated for. While 
a negligible share of less than 1 per cent of the displaced households owned cultivable land, 
almost 48% of the households who lost land due to relocation held cultivable land; and the 
same for unaffected households‟ stands at 12%. Also interestingly, while almost all of the 
land owners among land acquired and unaffected households held deeds for their agricultural 
land, only 25% of the corresponding households among displaced household had a deed for 
their cultivable plot (Table 2.2) 
 
[Table 2.2 is about here] 
 
On a related vein, Table 2.3, which shows that about 7 out of 10 members of the displaced 
households had to change their occupation or industry in comparison to about 2 out 10 
members amongst the land acquired households; the corresponding figure for unaffected 
households was about 6 out 10. However, a larger proportion of members from displaced 
households have found employment within FSEZ compared to members of land acquired 
households. 
 
[Table 2.3 is about here] 
 
About half of the respondents across all categories also expressed dissatisfaction over the 
salaries and wages paid at FSEZ and about third of the respondents also identified losing their 
livelihood due to the setup of FSEZ. Surprisingly though, the highest proportion of those 
losing livelihoods was reported among the unaffected villagers. Focus group discussion 
revealed that the setup of the FSEZ encompassed better road infrastructure, which adversely 
affected the traditional livelihoods of boating (a term locally used to describe the 
transportation of goods and livestock via boats) and fishing of Nainaners (the unaffected 
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village). Despite the adverse effects of FSEZ, about a third of the respondents also however 
noted that the setup of FSEZ has brought about better access to utilities such as water, 
electricity and also better infrastructure. The unaffected villagers reported reaping the highest 
benefits. 
 
[Table 2.4 is about here] 
 
Table 2.4 shows that female labour market participation was about 6-7 times that of men, 
affirming findings by Tejani (2011), who points out that one of the impacts of 
industrialisation of rural villages is the feminisation of the workforce. Unaffected household 
men and women reported higher labour market participation rates compared to both displaced 
and land acquired households. 
 
 
III. Empirical outcomes 
  
III-A. Determinants of household welfare 
We begin with a discussion on the determinants of household welfare. Household welfare is 
measured as per capita household consumption expenditure measured in the adult-equivalent 
scale. Table 3.1 reports the OLS regression outcomes. The first two columns show outcomes 
for the pooled model (N=1017) and the third, fourth and the fifth column shows results for 
displaced (N=462), land acquired (N=168) and unaffected (N=387) samples, respectively. 
Household size, a dummy for spilt household, number of male and female working age 
members, religious identity, total number of children are controlled for at the household level. 
In addition, we control for standard characteristics of the head of household including gender, 
age, education level and marital status. The models show between 10 to 15 per cent of the 
variation in the welfare measure. Our main variables of interest are dummy variables 
indicating displaced and land acquired households, unaffected households constitute the 
comparison group. We also include a dummy variable for households having a member 
working at FSEZ.  
 
[Table 3.1 is about here] 
 
As evident from the first two columns of Table 3.1, we do not find any statistically significant 
difference in the welfare level across the three household groups. Households with members 
working at FSEZ, on average, show higher consumption level however this effect becomes 
insignificant once we use interaction between this variable and displaced household. 
Education of the head of the household, especially secondary and higher, has positive return 
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to welfare level whereas larger households tend to depict lower welfare levels. Outcomes in 
both cases are statistically significant at 1 per cent. Among displaced households, those with 
members working in FSEZ have almost 17 per cent higher per capita consumption compared 
to the rest. This outcome is statistically significant, however it does not hold for the other 
groups of households.  
 
III-B. Profiles of the active labour market participants 
Next, we compare the factors related to workforce participation in the working age 
population for displaced and other types of households. The dependant variable is a dummy 
that takes the value one if an individual is currently employed (this includes both seasonal 
and permanent workers). The probit regression outcomes in Table 3.2.1 show that working 
age members from the displaced households are about 4 to 5 per cent less likely to take part 
in the labour market compared to working age members from the unaffected households. 
Similarly, working age members from land acquired group are about 7 to 8 per cent less 
likely to participate compared to the same group. However, introduction of additional 
controls at the household level weakens the power and size of the coefficient. Working age 
members of households with higher per capita consumption level are more likely to 
participate in the workforce whereas lower female labour force participation is evident across 
all model specifications. All models use standard individual and household specific controls 
as discussed for Table 3.1. The inclusion of interaction term shows that females from 
displaced households are less likely to participate in the labour market; however, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant.  
 
[Table 3.2.1 is about here] 
 
In table 3.2.2, we discuss similar probit estimations for restricted models. The first two 
columns show probit estimates for female and male samples, respectively. The following 
three columns show outcomes for displaced, land acquired and unaffected households, 
respectively. Both female and male members from affected groups of households are less 
likely to participate in the labour market activities. Looking at it differently, female working 
age members are significantly less likely to join the labour market for all groups of 
households echoing the descriptive evidence discussed in section 2. To conclude, gender gap 
in labour market activities persist across all households while the activity rate is slightly 
higher for the members of the unaffected households.  
 
[Table 3.2.2 is about here] 
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Two possible factors could explain this phenomenon. First, the availability of non-labour 
market related traditional livelihoods – such as farming, fishing, boating etc. and second, the 
lack of labour market opportunities. We discuss the latter in the next section. 
 
 
III-C. Profiles of FSEZ employees 
In the presence of lack of opportunities for affected households, if one can plausibly assume 
this, it is interesting to see how FSEZ contributes in improving the supply of jobs at FSEZ. In 
table 3.3.1, we show probit estimations of factors that are associated with being employed at 
FSEZ. This is an important concern and is directly linked with the main motivations of this 
paper, i.e., whether the effect of industrialization trickle downs to the households affected 
directly by the setting up of such economic zones. The outcomes in the first four columns of 
Table 3.3.1 is based on the sample of working age group members, whereas the probit 
estimations shown in the last two columns is based on only active labour market participants. 
The marginal effects seem to indicate that members from displaced households are about 3 to 
4 per cent more likely to be employed in FSEZ compared to unaffected households, whilst 
members from land taken households were about 6 per cent less likely to be employed within 
FSEZ. Once the household characteristics are controlled for, these effects become statistically 
insignificant. Once we include household welfare indicators and interaction between gender 
and being displaced, we find that women from displaced households were about five per cent 
less likely to participate in FSEZ compared to other working age populous in our sample. 
However, restricting the sample to active labour market participants, we find that displaced 
household members were about 8 to 10 per cent more likely to be employed within FSEZ and 
women from displaced households were statistically no different in employability within 
FSEZ. 
 
[Table 3.3.1 is about here] 
 
This warrants further investigation on female labour market participation within FSEZ from 
each category of household. Therefore we run probit estimates by restricting the samples by 
category of household. The first three columns of Table 3.3.2 report the results for each 
category of household for all working age members while the last three columns report the 
results by the category of household for only active labour market participants. The results 
from the table indicate that while women on average are less likely to participate in the labour 
market in general, of those who were already participating in the labour market, women were 
more likely to be employed within FSEZ than elsewhere. The results are significantly large in 
the range of 6 to 20 per cent, and are statistically significant at the 5 and 0.1 per cent levels.  
 
[Table 3.3.2 is about here] 
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III-D. Determinants of wages for all employees 
In this section we employ OLS estimates of the Mincerian wage regression model (Mincer, 
1974) to decipher the returns to education, experience and other factors associated with 
earnings. Returns to education and experience have been widely studied by labour 
economists using the human capital theory (Mincer, 1958, 1974; Becker 1964). In Mincer 
(1974)‟s proposed earnings function, the natural logarithm of earnings or wage is taken as a 
function of the key determinants of the accumulated human capital. The latter is identified in 
the function by a linear term for schooling and a linear and quadratic term for labour market 
experience. Algebraically, 
 
ln Wi = β0+ β1 (Schooling) i + β2 ln(Experience) i + e i 
 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations of the above function using the sample of active 
labour market participants are reported in Table 3.4.1. We consider log of annual wages as 
the dependent variable in all models. The results reported in Table 3.4.1 show pooled runs 
comprising of the three household categories. The first column shows outcomes with only 
individual level controls, the outcome in the second column account for household level 
controls. In the third and fourth columns, we show OLS outcomes controlling for occupation 
and industry fixed effects, where the fifth column shows result after controlling for 
individual, households, occupation and industry specific controls. We also use interactive 
terms with gender, education levels and displaced households, the outcomes are shown in the 
last two columns.   
 
[Table 3.4.1 is about here] 
 
Two important findings stand out from the regression outcomes shown in Table 3.4.1. First, 
on average, land acquired households are likely to earn 12-20 percentage points more than 
unaffected households. This outcome is consistent across all models and statistically 
significant. The margin is higher when we control for industry specific controls. Second, 
average earnings for women are 11-19 percentage point lower than that of men, robust 
outcomes across all models. We also find that members of displaced households on average 
earn more than members of unaffected households; however the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Outcomes from models with interactive terms are particularly 
dejecting for women in displaced households. Completion of secondary and higher education 
is associated with higher returns to wages; the statistically significant coefficients indicate a 
range of 12 to 50 percentage point increase in wages. Returns to experience are positive but 
the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, education premium for 
members of displaced households yield a negative return as shown in the last column of 
Table 3.4.1. We discuss these issues further in the next section. 
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[Table 3.4.2 is about here] 
 
Table 3.4.2 shows outcomes of the Mincerian wage regression models but for restricted 
samples. The first two columns in Table 3.4.2 shows outcomes for displaced households, the 
next two column for land acquired households and the last two columns show similar 
outcomes for unaffected households. Members of displaced households earn less if they work 
at FSEZ, however for members of other household groups we find the opposite outcome. 
Likewise, there is significant gender gap in earnings across all models. Education premium 
for women is positive among displaced and land acquired households, however the outcome 
is negative for unaffected households.  Overall, the outcomes from restricted model show a 
more nuanced picture of the nexus between gender, education and experiences in determining 
annual earnings. The regression models in both tables, on average, explain 10 to 20 per cent 
variation in wages.  
 
 
III-E. Determinants of wages for FSEZ employees 
In this section we repeat the discussion of wage determination in light of FSEZ employees. 
The regression outcomes shown in Table 3.5.1 uses a restricted sample of only household 
members working within the FSEZ. The Mincerian wage regression models explain 15 to 25 
per cent variation in wages for FSEZ employees. Among FSEZ employees, after controlling 
for individual fixed and household specific effects, members of displaced and land acquired 
households are the lowest and highest earners, respectively. In most of the models, the 
outcome is statistically significant for FSEZ employees from displaced households. Female 
employees in FSEZ from displaced households earn particularly less, echoing the previous 
findings for all employees. Returns to education and experience show mixed outcomes, but 
outcomes are not statistically significant. However, education premium for displaced 
households yields positive but statistically insignificant returns (especially for those who 
received secondary and higher education).  
 
[Table 3.5.1 is about here] 
 
To wrap up, the empirical results thus seem to indicate strong positive returns to education 
among all three categories of households with an exception for FSEZ employees. We find 
three distinctive features of FSEZ employees in the context of wage determination. First, 
returns to education and experience for FSEZ employees show a lower, statistically 
insignificant and often negative coefficient compared to what we find in general. Second, the 
magnitude of gender wage gap against women is 5 to 10 percentage points higher for FSEZ 
employees. Third, secondary and higher education premium for members of displaced 
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households yield positive returns when working at FSEZ as opposed to showing a negative 
relationship in general. One possible explanation for insignificant return on experience, from 
the focus group discussions, is that the nature of the work within FSEZ and even in some 
other sectors of salaried employment (such as carpentry, assembly line work etc.) did not 
necessarily favour those with experience, and therefore the returns to experience were not 
significantly higher.   
 
IV. Discussion 
In this section, we put forward a discussion based on the empirical outcomes. Specifically, 
we compare findings from different age cohorts to get a dynamic picture of the changes in 
livelihood effects in and around FSEZ.   
 
IV-A. What is the likelihood of a displaced household member being employed? 
The empirical findings indicate a lower labour market participation rate among affected 
household members, however gender gap in labour market activities persist across all 
households. To get a better sense of how persistent this gender participation gap is, across 
different age groups, we look at the labour force participation (LFP) rate by age cohorts, 
gender and household categories (Table 4.1). We consider two age cohorts: 15 to 35 years as 
young group, and 45 to 65 years as old group. For displaced households, the lower LFP rate 
of members in the old group (stands at only 11% as compared to 20% for land acquired and 
26% for unaffected) might explain the overall lower LFP rate. Similarly, for land acquired 
households lower LFP rate in the young group (stands at 54% as compared to 63% for 
displaced and 67% for unaffected) could similarly explain the overall lower LFP rate 
compared to unaffected households. Findings from our focus group discussions suggest that 
on reasons for lower LFP rates for land acquired households could be that a large number of 
teenagers and young adults from these households are pursuing higher studies. 
 
[Table 4.1 is about here] 
 
IV-B. What is the likelihood of a displaced household member being employed at the 
FSEZ?  
Among displaced households, about 36% and 25% of active male employees from young and 
old cohorts respectively are attached to FSEZ related employment (Table 4.1). This rate is 
higher compared to members from other household groups. The female participation rate 
within FSEZ is similar between displaced and unaffected households. For land acquired 
households, higher likelihood of engaging in salaried or self-employed activities could 
explain their lower participation rate within FSEZ. The nature of employment at FSEZ 
remains predominantly informal. Such informal positions are “contracted-out” through 
“contractors” – a term locally used to refer to middlemen who act as agents recruiting on 
12 
 
behalf of the FSEZ companies. Contractors have a regional/locale presence and bias, it 
defines their area of operation and expertise. The contractors only source for unskilled labour 
(casual labour) and are not awarded contracts for “desk jobs” (a local term used to refer to 
semi-skilled and skilled jobs).  Based on the accounts of locals, contractors are primarily used 
by the companies to pass on responsibility, and take no legal binding on the employment of 
casual labour. The contracting of work to middlemen also allows companies flexibility on the 
staffing, as one villager noted „hiring and firing if and when they want‟.  
 
IV-C. Do members of displaced households enjoy similar returns to education and 
experience compared to other affected households? Does this result hold for those 
working at FSEZ? 
We plot predicted log wages across years of schooling by household categories in Figure 4.1. 
We get some interesting trends. For all employees, returns to education show similar trends 
across years of education for all groups. For FSEZ employees, the return is somewhat lower 
for displaced households and this outcome is driven by female employees. We see a higher 
gender wage gap in returns to education for female members from displaced households who 
are employed in FSEZ. Overall, for all FSEZ employees the predicted log wages are constant 
across years of schooling whereas there is a positive trend for the rest employed elsewhere.  
The work-contractor system, which entails the service of a middle-man in recruiting and 
defining wages for employees on behalf of companies within FSEZ, may explain this 
disparity. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) revealed that the number of such „contractors‟ 
were proportionally lower in Highland (village with displaced households), creating an 
oligopolistic market for work contracts in unfavourable wage terms for women from 
displaced households. The general negative trend in wage across schooling years also may be 
explained using the same „contractor‟ system. The FGDs reveal a favouring of younger-less 
educated women by the middleman hiring on behalf of the companies, and thus eventually 
ensuring a higher wage for them.  
 
[Figure 4.1 is about here] 
 
IV-D. Does the FSEZ generate employment for women?  
The second panel of Table 4.1 highlights that „younger‟ women have a higher participation 
rate for work within FSEZ, and that nearly half of all labour market participating women are 
employed within FSEZ (with the exception of women from land acquired households). 
Among the active labour market participants, more than 50% of female employees from 
displaced and unaffected household groups work in FSEZ. One of the benefits of FSEZ based 
on the responses of the households is an increase in labour force participation for women. 
Thus, univocally it can be inferred that FSEZ has generated employment for women. As 
voiced by many during the FGDs, contractors have been instrumental in the feminisation of 
the FSEZ workforce. On the account of one such contractor, of the 12,000 workers in FSEZ 
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an overwhelming 75% are women. The villagers point out that “Women are employed rather 
than men, because they are easy to control and more work can be extracted from them”. 
Contractors have also according to accounts, been advised to always keep young people in 
the labour pool and discard older individuals and individuals who are deemed not so efficient.  
 
IV-E. Does FSEZ prevent gender wage discrimination? 
The estimates show that women are likely to earn about 17 percentage points less compared 
to men after controlling for education and experience, which is significantly lower than the 
national statistics identified in Mahajan and Ramaswami (2012). However, the magnitude of 
gender wage gap against women is 5 to 10 percentage points higher for FSEZ employees. 
The upper panel of Table 4.2 indicates that there is a significant gender gap in the wages, 
especially among the older affected household members. Land acquired household members 
seemed to on average earn more than displaced and unaffected household members across 
both gender groups. Given that the FSEZ participation rate among active labour market 
members of the land acquired households was lower than the other two categories of 
household, the statistics seem to confirm that FSEZ wage rates may be lower than wage rates 
elsewhere. The statistics also indicate a narrowing gender gap in wages as evident from those 
in the younger age cohort. 
 
[Table 4.2 is about here] 
 
To shed some light on whether the narrowing gender gap over time is resulting from a 
narrowing educational attainment, we look at the average years of schooling by gender, age 
cohorts and household categories. The outcomes are shown in the lower panel of Table 4.2. It 
is evident that the gender gap in years of schooling has lowered over time for all categories of 
households. For older cohorts gender gap in years of schooling was the highest among 
members of displaced households. The drop in gender schooling gap is about 77 per cent for 
displaced households, followed by a drop by 69 per cent and 67 per cent for land acquired 
and unaffected households, respectively. This partially supports other studies such as Tejani 
(2011), who concludes with the narrowing education gap, the wage gap too has narrowed 
between the sexes over the years. To conclude, gender wage gap has lowered over time, but 
still persists and the gap is larger among FSEZ employees.  
 
  
V. Conclusion 
The recent political upheaval transgressing from the state-led industrialization drive in many 
parts of India, particularly in the state of West Bengal points to the need for a sustainable 
policy. A framework is avidly sought after that result in a positive sum game, benefiting the 
indigenous communities without hurting the growth prospects. On-going debates have 
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underscored the importance of an optimum compensation for those who sacrificed their land 
for industrialization purposes. It takes care of the short-term worries. But, growth dividends 
from industrialization are likely to be materialized in the long-run, and an optimum 
compensation may not guarantee a windfall to the affected parties in the long-term. Little is 
known on the long-term livelihood effects of an industrialization area and thus it has 
remained more of a speculation exercise to gauge the consequences of industrialization on 
affected households.  
This paper addresses this issue directly. We conducted a household survey near Falta special 
economic zone (FSEZ), which was established in 1984. Falta special economic zone is the 
first SEZ in West Bengal and one of the successfully running industrial areas in India. To 
compare the livelihood effect of FSEZ we consider three types of households: displaced, land 
acquired and unaffected. We use unaffected households as a control group to examine 
whether there exists any differential livelihood effects of FSEZ across different categories of 
households.   
The empirical findings indicate a lower labour market participation rate among affected 
household members, however gender gap in labour market activities persist across all 
households. There is weak empirical evidence indicating that members from displaced 
households are 8 per cent more likely to be employed in FSEZ compared to unaffected 
households whereas members of land acquired households were about 6 per cent less likely to 
be employed within FSEZ. Returns to education are positive and statistically significant 
across all three categories of households. Completion of secondary and higher education is 
associated with from 12 to 50 percentage point increase in wages. However, returns to 
education are significantly lower for displaced households working within FSEZ, and this 
outcome is predominantly driven by female employees. Among female employees within 
FSEZ, members of displaced households earn less consistently across each schooling year. 
Among the active labour market participants, more than 50% of female employees from 
displaced and unaffected household groups work in FSEZ. Gender wag gap persist, our 
estimates show that women earn about 17 percentage points less compared to men after 
controlling for education and experience. However, there is evidence of the narrowing 
education gap over time; similar evidence is found for the gender wage gap as well.  
We hope that this study bridges a significant knowledge gap in the literature related to the 
welfare effect of industrialization especially for the less-privileged members of the society. 
Our findings thus indicate the need for a policy framework to address SEZ related 
displacement, livelihood and gender issues. Policy frameworks also require affirmative 
implementation spearheaded by local administrative units. FGDs revealed that many 
initiatives such as the vocational training institute setup as part of the FSEZ to train and equip 
displaced villagers with skills that benefit their employment within FSEZ were abandoned 
within the first couple of years. Further, the current informal sector recruitments create 
insecurity in wage and thus welfare – including but not restricted to education for children, 
healthcare etc. This warrants action from the state to ensure implementation of labour laws 
that protect affected workers within SEZ – particularly those who had been evicted for the 
setup of the SEZ, and women.  
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Figure 2.1: The villages studied in this paper. 
 
Note: 1 – Nainan, 2 – New Gopalpur (“Higland”), 3 – Gopalpur. 
Source: Google Maps and authors‟ own point reference.  
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Figure 2.2:  Map of Nainan Village 
 
Note: The yellow line running across the village is the 500m radius mark from FSEZ. Houses 
to the north of this imaginary line were surveyed for our study. The grey lines indicate 
pathways. 
 
Source: Google Maps and authors‟ own point reference.  
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Village Displaced Land Acquired 
for resettlement 
Unaffected Total 
A: Household Level 
Number of households in each Village:     
Highland 460 1 5 466 
Gopalpur 0 107 52 159 
Nainan 2 60 330 392 
Total 462 168 387 1,017 
Characteristics:     
Household Size 4.9 4.5 4.4 4.6 
No. of Children (<13 years) 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.1 
No. of female in WAP 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 
No. of male in WAP 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.4 
Age of the head 43.6 50.9 44.3 45.0 
Female head (Yes=1) 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 
Head of the HH with no formal 
schooling (Yes=1) 
0.40 0.26 0.45 0.40 
Mean per capita adult equivalent 
expenditure (in INR): Muslim 
13,433 13,667 12,367 13,059 
Mean per capita adult equivalent 
expenditure (in INR): Hindu SC/ST 
12,813 14,012 14,349 13,593 
B: Individual Level 
Number of individuals in each Village:     
Highland 2,269 13 33 2,315 
Gopalpur 0 468 214 682 
Nainan 9 290 1,484 1,783 
Total 2,278 771 1,731 4,780 
Characteristics:     
Female (Yes=1) 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.48 
Age 25.4 30.3 26.1 26.4 
No schooling (Yes=1) 0.36 0.23 0.38 0.35 
Primary education (Yes=1) 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.31 
Secondary education (Yes=1) 0.26 0.38 0.28 0.28 
Note: WAP – Working Age Population. INR – Indian Rupee. 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Table 2.2: Means of agricultural plot holdings 
 
Category Share of households 
owning agricultural plot 
Share of households owning deed for 
the agricultural plot owned 
Displaced 0.8% 25.0% 
Land acquired for 
resettlement 
47.6% 93.8% 
Unaffected 11.6% 100% 
Total 12.7% 93.8% 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Table 2.3: Effects of the setup of FSEZ 
 
  Displaced 
 
(N=462) 
Land 
Acquired 
(N=168) 
Unaffected 
 
(N=387) 
A. FSEZ: present and future    
A1. Any HH member changed occupation / industry due to 
FSEZ 
67% 23% 64% 
A2. HHs with member(s) currently working at FSEZ 37% 15% 27% 
A3. Willing to move with an adequate compensation 
package 
 
16% 8% 18% 
B. Adverse effects due to FSEZ    
B1. Loss of livelihood (Yes=1) 31% 27% 35% 
B2. Inadequate resettlement plot (Yes=1) 7% 16% 9% 
B3. Lower salary compared to other regions (Yes=1) 
 
44% 53% 52% 
C. Benefits due to FSEZ    
C1. Better infrastructure (Yes=1) 33% 30% 36% 
C2. Lower unemployment (Yes=1) 14% 14% 18% 
C3. Increase in female labour force participation (Yes=1) 14% 23% 14% 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Table 2.4: Labour participation rates 
 
 
Displaced Land acquired Unaffected 
 ALMP LFPR ALMP LFPR ALMP LFPR 
Female 88% 77% 88% 72% 83% 78% 
Male 12% 12% 12% 12% 17% 12% 
Note: ALMP – Active Labour Market Participants; LFPR – Labour Force Participation Rate 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Table 3.1: Determinants of welfare (per capita household expenditure)  
 
Dep Var. = per capita household expenditure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HH member working in FSEZ (Yes=1) 0.072* -0.014 0.161*** 0.048 -0.042 
Displaced 0.044 -0.009    
Land taken -0.089 -0.094*    
Displaced* HH member working in FSEZ  0.166** 
 
 
  
Individual controls      
Household controls      
Constant 9.673*** 9.689*** 9.523*** 9.759*** 9.766*** 
R2 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.15 
N  1,017 1,017 462 168 387 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The first two specifications are run for the pooled 
sample, while columns three (3) to (5) are run for the restricted sample of each category of 
household in the order: displaced, land taken and unaffected. Individual level controls include 
the following covariates: gender, natural logarithm of the age, dummies for level of education 
and dummies for marital status. Household level controls include the following covariates: 
household size, dummy for split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the 
number of male and female working adult members.  
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Table 3.2.1: Profiles of active labour market participants (pooled model) 
 
Dep Var. = Labour force participation rate (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Displaced 
-0.126* 
(-0.048) 
-0.100 
(-0.035) 
-0.106 
(-0.037) 
-0.054 
(-0.018) 
Land taken 
-0.223** 
(-0.082) 
-0.195* 
(-0.073) 
-0.178 
(-0.067) 
-0.171 
(-0.064) 
Female (Yes=1) 
-2.041*** 
(-0.661) 
-2.077*** 
(-0.673) 
-2.088*** 
(-0.675) 
-2.029*** 
(-0.661) 
Log(PCHHE)   
0.200** 
(0.078) 
0.202** 
(0.079) 
Displaced* Female   
 
 
-0.128 
(-0.048) 
Individual controls     
Household controls     
Constant -1.146*** -0.873** -2.730*** -2.767*** 
N  3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. The 
sample comprises of the working age population, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 65 
inclusive. Individual level controls include the following covariates: natural logarithm of the age, 
dummies for level of education and dummies for marital status. Household level controls include 
the following covariates: household size, dummy for split households, number of children, 
ethnicity/religion, and the number of male and female working adult members. PCHHE – Per 
capita household expenditure 
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Table 3.2.2: Profiles of active labour market participants (restricted model) 
 
Dep Var. = Labour force participation 
rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Displaced 
-0.148 
(-0.024) 
-0.057 
(-0.016) 
 
  
Land taken 
-0.350* 
(-0.052) 
-0.066 
(-0.026) 
 
  
Female (Yes=1)   
-2.197*** 
(-0.694) 
-1.955*** 
(-0.615) 
-2.034*** 
(-0.675) 
Individual controls      
Household controls      
Constant -2.859*** 0.021 -0.928 -2.430** -0.564 
N  1,585 1,707 1,563 567 1,162 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. The 
sample comprises of the working age population, defined as those between the ages of 15 and 65 
inclusive. The first two specifications are run for the restricted samples of female only and male 
only respectively, while columns three (3) to (5) are run for the restricted sample of members 
from each category of household in the order: displaced, land taken and unaffected. Individual 
level controls include the following covariates: natural logarithm of the age, dummies for level 
of education and dummies for marital status. Household level controls include the following 
covariates: household size, dummy for split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, 
and the number of male and female working adult members. 
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Table 3.3.1: Profiles of FSEZ workers among active labour market participants (pooled 
model) 
 
Dep Var. = Work in FSEZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Displaced 
0.171** 
(0.028) 
0.109 
(0.018) 
0.092 
(0.015) 
0.224** 
(0.036) 
0.250** 
(0.079) 
0.314*** 
(0.099) 
Land taken 
-0.412*** 
(-0.057) 
-0.230 
(-0.033) 
-0.211 
((-0.030) 
-0.200 
(-0.029) 
-0.178 
(-0.054) 
-0.167 
(-0.051) 
Female (Yes=1) 
-0.825*** 
(-0.136) 
-0.872*** 
(-0.136) 
-0.882*** 
 (-0.137) 
-0.671*** 
 (-0.103) 
0.591*** 
(0.211) 
0.778*** 
(0.282) 
Log(PCHHE)   
0.222*** 
(0.034) 
0.222*** 
(0.034) 
  
Displaced* Female   
 
 
-0.407** 
(-0.054) 
 -0.402 
(-0.110) 
Individual controls       
Household controls       
Constant -0.847** 0.187 -1.850*** -1.916** 2.311*** 2.312*** 
N  3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292 1,377 1,377 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. For 
columns one (1) to four (4), the sample comprises of the working age population, defined as 
those between the ages of 15 and 65 inclusive; for columns five (5) to six (6), the sample 
comprises of those actively participating in the labour market; and the corresponding dependent 
variable being the percentage of active labour market participants working within FSEZ. 
Individual level controls include the following covariates: natural logarithm of the age, dummies 
for level of education and dummies for marital status. Household level controls include the 
following covariates: household size, dummy for split households, number of children, 
ethnicity/religion, and the number of male and female working adult members. PCHHE – Per 
capita household expenditure 
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Table 3.3.2: Profiles of FSEZ workers among active labour market participants 
(restricted model) 
 
Dep Var. = Work in FSEZ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female (Yes=1) 
-1.073*** 
(-0.185) 
-0.719*** 
(-0.059) 
-0.700*** 
 (-0.106) 
0.417* 
 (0.157) 
0.765* 
(0.209) 
0.711*** 
(0.244) 
Log(age) 
-0.186 
(-0.030) 
-0.154 
(-0.013) 
-0.338 
(-0.065) 
-0.621** 
(-0.204) 
-0.592 
(-0.111) 
-0.909*** 
(-0.282) 
Primary (Yes=1) 
0.035 
(0.005) 
-0.172 
(-0.015) 
0.133 
(0.018) 
0.179 
(0.063) 
-0.369 
(-0.073) 
0.101 
(0.020) 
Secondary (Yes-1) 
0.146 
(0.024) 
-0.272 
(-0.022) 
0.200 
(0.031) 
0.327* 
(0.114) 
-0.280 
(-0.051) 
0.359* 
(0.104) 
Higher (Yes=1) 
0.280 
(0.053) 
-0.415 
(-0.025) 
0.353 
(0.064) 
0.546* 
(0.201) 
-0.564 
(-0.080) 
0.797* 
(0.283) 
Individual controls       
Household controls       
Constant -0.240 0.793 0.175 2.228** 3.707* 2.380** 
N  1,559 545 1157 637 215 513 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Marginal fixed effects reported in parantheses. For 
columns one (1) to three (3), the sample comprises of the working age population, defined as 
those between the ages of 15 and 65 inclusive, for the restricted sample of members from each 
category of household in the order: displaced, land taken and unaffected.. For columns four (4) 
to six (6), the sample comprises of those actively participating in the labour market; and the 
corresponding dependent variable being the percentage of active labour market participants 
working within FSEZ, for the restricted sample of members from each category of household in 
the order: displaced, land taken and unaffected. Individual level controls includes the marital 
status. Household level controls include the following covariates: household size, dummy for 
split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the number of male and female 
working adult members. PCHHE – Per capita household expenditure 
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Table 3.4.1: Determinants of wages for all employees (pooled model) 
 
Dep Var. = log(wage) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Displaced 0.011 0.034 0.018 0.017 0.053 0.059 0.022 
Land taken 0.179*** 0.126* 0.169*** 0.206*** 0.112* 0.133** 0.124* 
Work in FSEZ 
(Yes=1) 
-0.006 -0.018 0.002 0.022 0.005 -0.021 -0.016 
Female (Yes=1) -0.163*** -0.188*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.187*** -0.110* -0.189*** 
Log(experience) 0.083 0.064 0.089 0.100 0.084 0.067 0.056 
Primary (Yes=1) 0.078* 0.068 0.060 0.060 0.045 0.065 0.032 
Secondary (Yes-1) 0.175*** 0.160*** 0.140*** 0.138*** 0.117** 0.157*** 0.161** 
Higher (Yes=1) 0.454*** 0.430 0.307*** 0.321*** 0.243*** 0.429*** 0.495*** 
Displaced*Female      -0.178  
Displaced*Primary       0.074 
Displaced*Secondary       -0.006 
Displaced*Higher       -0.176 
Occupation category        
Industry category        
Household controls        
Constant 10.328*** 10.279*** 10.871*** 11.013*** 10.838*** 10.306*** 10.255*** 
R2 0.116 0.131 0.175 0.157 0.210 0.134 0.134 
N  1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 1,376 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The sample comprises of those actively participating 
in the labour market. At the individual we also control for age and marital status. Household 
level controls include the following covariates: household size, dummy for split households, 
number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the number of male and female working adult 
members. 
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Table 3.4.2: Determinants of wages for all employees (restricted model) 
 
Dep Var. = log(wage) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Work in FSEZ -0.098* -0.087* 0.034 0.011 0.073 0.064 
Female (Yes=1) -0.261*** -0.293** -0.275* -0.361 -0.127* -0.046 
Log(experience) 0.120 0.140 -0.245 -0.224 0.122 0.128 
Primary (Yes=1) 0.103 0.101 0.011 -0.039 0.048 0.078 
Secondary (Yes=1) 0.135* 0.128* 0.191 0.158 0.169** 0.194** 
Higher (Yes=1) 0.337*** 0.310** 0.498* 0.512* 0.424** 0.519*** 
Female*Primary  0.005  0.379  -0.150 
Female*Secondary  0.096  0.130  -0.088 
Female*Higher  0.321  -0.222  -0.531 
Household controls       
Constant 10.841*** 10.896*** 8.163*** 8.330*** 10.595*** 10.610*** 
R2 0.132 0.134 0.187 0.194 0.109 0.116 
N  636 636 225 225 515 515 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors reported in parantheses. . 
Columns one (1) and two (2) comprise of the displaced sample of working age population 
members; columns three (3) and four (4), land take sample of working age population members 
and columns five (5) and six (6) unaffected working age population members.  At the individual 
we also control for age and marital status. Household level controls include the following 
covariates: household size, dummy for split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, 
and the number of male and female working adult members. 
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Table 3.5.1: Determinants of wages for FSEZ employees (pooled model) 
 
Dep Var. = log(wage) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Displaced -0.110* -0.110* -0.107* -0.112* -0.110 -0.038 -0.120 
Land taken 0.103 0.084 0.081 0.105 0.070 0.091 0.083 
Female (Yes=1) -0.272*** -0.254*** -0.262*** -0.264*** -0.238*** -0.111 -0.252*** 
Log(experience) 0.127 0.100 0.132 0.144 0.099 0.144 0.113 
Primary (Yes=1) -0.050 -0.052 -0.038 -0.054 -0.045 -0.056 -0.035 
Secondary (Yes-1) 0.021 0.010 0.019 0.018 0.012 0.005 -0.008 
Higher (Yes=1) 0.105 0.068 0.066 0.096 0.042 0.074 0.035 
Displaced*Female      -0.295*  
Displaced*Primary       -0.026 
Displaced*Secondary       0.034 
Displaced*Higher       0.072 
Occupation category        
Industry category        
Household controls        
Constant 10.796*** 10.673*** 11.386*** 11.065*** 11.329*** 10.945*** 10.736*** 
R2 0.162 0.184 0.199 0.180 0.226 0.203 0.186 
N  367 367 367 367 367 367 367 
Note:  *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors reported in parantheses. The 
sample comprises of those currently being employed within FSEZ. At the individual we also 
control for age and marital status. Household level controls include the following covariates: 
household size, dummy for split households, number of children, ethnicity/religion, and the 
number of male and female working adult members. 
 
  
30 
 
Table 4.1: Labour force participation and employment at FSEZ rates 
 
Cohorts 
Displaced Land Acquired Unaffected 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
A. Labour force participation       
A1. Young: 15 to 35 years 8% 63% 7% 54% 8% 67% 
A2. Old: 35 to 65 years 11% 76% 20% 72% 26% 72% 
B. Employment at FSEZ       
B1. Young: 15 to 35 years 53% 36% 36% 17% 52% 26% 
B2. Old: 35 to 65 years 14% 25% 8% 2% 28% 6% 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Table 4.2: Years of schooling and wage by age, gender and household category 
 
Cohorts Displaced Land Acquired Unaffected 
A. Mean Wages (female as % of male) 
A1. Young: 15 to 35 years 76.36% 79.31% 92.62% 
A2. Old: 35 to 65 years 75.80% 52.08% 89.41% 
B. Mean years of schooling (female as % of male) 
B1. Young: 15 to 35 years 88.46% 89.61% 85.45% 
B2. Old: 35 to 65 years 37.78% 57.38% 33.33% 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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Figure 4.1: Predicted log wages across years of schooling by household categories 
 
Note: The x-axis represents the years of schooling, while the y-axis represents the natural 
logarithm of wages. The solid lines represent female employees and the dotted lines represent male 
employees 
Source: Authors‟ own calculations. 
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